There are nonetheless procedural hurdles for invoking multiple responsibilities of States before the Court. The admissibility thresholds enshrined in the Convention prevent applications which do not entertain a genuine link between the State and the individual (jurisdiction) 10 or an actual relationship between the alleged misconduct and damages suffered (victim) 11 . Further, the indispensable parties rule principle may still be relevant for applications involving the legal obligations of Non-Contracting
States. 21 One prominent exception are extradition and expulsion cases, dealt with in section 3.4 below.
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to fall within the jurisdiction of France. 26 The reasoning of the Court could be taken to signify that, if to guarantee human rights comes in conflict with another State's sovereignty, the notion of jurisdiction precludes the Convention from being applicable.
27
In a majority of cases however, the Court has stressed that 'jurisdiction' does not so In Bankovic, the Grand Chamber had reasoned that the first approach would render the words 'within their jurisdiction' in Article 1 'superfluous and devoid of any purpose' because it would equate the jurisdiction requirement with the question whether a person can be considered to be a victim of a violation of rights guaranteed by the Convention. 31 Instead, the Court had recourse to the test of 'effective control'
as it had employed in its case law on Northern-Cyprus. 32 Although the Court did not elaborate on the exact contours of this test, one may deduce from Bankovic and later cases where the effective control test was applied, that it would be necessary that, apart from the contested act itself, some further 'jurisdictional link' exists between the State and the individual. This may be that a State is an occupying power, 33 that it exercises public powers which are normally appertainable to the territorial State, 34 or that the individual is subject to the State's exclusive physical power or control. 35 One problem with the Bankovic reasoning was however that the Court in later judgments appeared to adopt a lower threshold. 36 The judgment in Al-Skeini on the conduct of British troops in Iraq, was a fresh attempt of the Grand Chamber at placing the general applicable principles at sounder footing.
Although the Court revisited the earlier Bankovic principles (by noting, contrary to in its power to take and are in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention". 39 The finding of violations on the part of Russia in the notorious case of Ilascu is grounded in a similar rationale.
40
The manner in which the Court will further shape its doctrine on jurisdiction and extraterritorial activity is of crucial importance for issues of shared responsibility. Up to now, to quote judge Bonello, concurring in Al-Skeini, "the Court's case-law on Article 1 of the Convention has been bedevilled by an inability or an unwillingness to establish a coherent and axiomatic regime, grounded in essential basics and evenhandedly applicable across the widest spectrum of jurisdictional controversies."
Bonello advances an approach that jurisdiction is neither territorial nor extraterritorial, but means "no less and no more than "authority over" and "control of"." Jurisdiction, he continues, then arises "from the mere fact of having assumed those Stephens, living in Canada, to enter his house located in the UN buffer zone in Cyprus, because the Cypriot national guard had erected a defence post in the garden of his house. The Court firstly observed that in so far as the complaint was directed against Cyprus and Turkey, these states did not have effective control over the buffer zone in which the applicant's house was located. But the Court subsequently noted that the applicant had neither challenged 'a particular action or inaction by these States or otherwise substantiated any breach by the said States of their duty to take all the appropriate measures with regard to the applicant's rights which are still within their power to take'. 40 In view of the "effective authority, or at the very least the decisive influence" asserted by the Russian Federation over the separatist regime in Transdniestria, Moldova, the Court considered the victims to come within the jurisdiction of Russia, even though the agents of the Russian Federation had not participated directly in the events complained of. It concluded amongst other things that Russia had not made (positive) attempts to put an end to the applicants' situation throughout their period of detention: Ilascu (n 16) para 392-4. 
Principles of shared responsibility in the case law of the court

Concurrent responsibility between independent wrongdoers
There is abundant 
Responsibility for acting on behalf of another State
In the above cases, the conduct of the respective States was easily identifiable and The rule of exclusive attribution in respect of organs placed at behalf of another State will normally preclude situations of multiple, or shared, responsibility from arising.
This may be explained from the principle of independent responsibility and its underlying premise that a State can only be held responsible for conduct if it is directly involved in that conduct and, a contrario, not for conduct of an organ that functions autonomously from the State. 91 In Drozd and Janousek, two of the appended dissenting opinions voiced concerns over the consequences of this rule of exclusive attribution. In the dissenters' view, even though the judges served in a capacity independent from France and Spain, these two countries nonetheless enjoyed significant authority and influence over the judiciary and administration in Andorra.
In their capacity as Co-Princes of Andorra, France and Spain were amongst other functions directly responsible for the enforcement of sentences of Andorran courts and competent to issue new legislation. 92 The dissenters argued that the special position of the two States obliged them to secure in Andorra the fundamental principles of the Convention.
The dissenters raise a salient point, as it may well be that, even though the specific conduct of an organ put at the disposal of 
Responsibility for joint conduct
One exception to the rule of exclusive attribution is when States truly act in concert.
State responsibility for joint conduct (be it of ad hoc character or of a common organ)
is not expressly addressed in the Articles on State Responsibility, but, according to the ILC, the solution is implicit in them: 'according to the principles on which those articles are based, the conduct of the common organ can only be considered as an act legal rights and duties of other States, this is not necessarily the case if the assessment is restricted to the particular role played by the respondent State. Indeed, the primary request of the applicant, his wife Ilse Hess, had been for the Commission 'to press the United Kingdom to step up its efforts to secure renegotiation of the Four Power Agreement in order to obtain the release' of her husband. A reasoning under the doctrine of positive obligations -and in conformity with the principle of independent responsibility -would be sustainable that because the United Kingdom was legally and factually capable of exerting influence, it should therefore had taken the steps within its power to prevent possible violations under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR from occurring.
Derived responsibility for conduct of another State
There may also be scenarios where the responsibility of a State's depends on another 
Member State responsibility for a wrongful act of an international organisation
The law to the present case", the applicant had not put forward any arguments supporting a finding that the protection of fundamental rights within the framework of the European Patent Organisation was not equivalent to Convention protection".
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In Gasparini however, the Court did accept that Member States could be held responsible under the Convention for acts of NATO resulting from 'structural human rights weaknesses' in the internal structure of the organisation. 123 Because intrinsic deficiencies in the staff regulations of NATO were at issue, the Court found it necessary to consider whether the mechanisms for settling internal labour disputes did not display a 'manifest deficit' -the test borrowed from Bosphorus. 124 The apparent justification for this distinction between incidental decisions and structural characteristics of the organization is that the latter necessarily involve the consent of the member States, either at the moment of accession or when the regulations are adopted. 125 This rationale can be traced back to the earlier cases of Heinz and Matthews, where member State responsibility for a wrongful act of an international organisation -absent intervention or participation of a member State in the act -was derived from the act constituting a mere implementation of (founding) treaty commitments of the member State(s). 126 The lower level of scrutiny expressed in the manifest deficiency test is grounded, as it is in Bosphorus (see below), in the separate legal identity of the international organisation and the fact that it is not a Contracting 
Attributing conduct to the State or the organisation
The question of whether particular conduct should be attributed to either the member State or the international organization was addressed by the Court in the two landmark cases of Behrami and Al-Jedda, both concerning military operations authorized by the United Nations.
In Behrami, in respect of the conduct of KFOR, the peacekeeping force led by NATO, the Court reasoned that by virtue of the ultimate authority and control retained by the UN Security Council over the mission, the impugned acts of KFOR were attributable to the UN and not to the contributing States, even though the latter retained retain some authority over their troops. 127 Although it had additional recourse to the fact that the Contracting Parties joined the UN before they signed the Convention and the imperative nature of the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Court seemed to postulate a general attribution rule applicable to organs placed at the disposal of an international organisation. In respect of UNMIK, the Court did not refer to the criterion of ultimate authority and control, but found decisive that it was a subsidiary organ of the UN and, as such, institutionally directly and fully answerable to the Security Council. Therefore, its acts were attributable to the UN only.
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Behrami was criticized for applying an overly broad standard of attribution ('ultimate authority and control') which was moreover seen to differ from the attribution rule of Article 7 (then 5) of the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations adopted on second reading in 2011 (which was drafted precisely with a view to UN peacekeeping operations) -which speaks of 'effective control'. 129 Under the latter test, rather than the delegation model and institutional chain of command which were 127 Behrami (n 5) para 132-141. 128 Ibid, para 142-143. . The Distrcit Court proceeded from 'the generally accepted' principle that more than one party can exercise 'effective control' over conduct in the course of a peacekeeping operation and, leaving open the possibility of attributing the activities of Dutchbat to the UN, found that that the Dutch government actively instructed the Dutch contingent in the course of the evacuation from Srebrenica and that therefore they could be said to exercise 'effective control'. Particularly salient is that the Court of Appeal, in conceptualizing the standard of effective control, not only accords significance to specific instructions issued by the State, but also to the ability, or power ('macht'), to prevent the impugned conduct. Although the Court situates this factual ability to intervene in the attribution rule of Article7 of the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, it is also possible to construe this as a protective duty quite separate from the actual misconduct of the Dutchbat soldiers. presupposes an organ to be 'fully seconded' to the organisation, while Article 7 applies only when the lent organ still acts 'to a certain extent as organ of the lending 
Responsibility for implementing decisions
The third and final topical issue in the Court's case law on international organisations concerns the relation between the Convention and implementing activity of member
States. Bosphorus, concerning the Irish implementation of a EC regulation that was allegedly in conflict with the right to property, has become the leading case.
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In Bosphorus, the Court sought to reconcile two principles set forth in its earlier case law: on the one hand, the separate legal identity of the international organisation and the freedom of Contracting Parties to transfer power to an international organisation;
and on the other hand the principle that a Contracting Party is responsible under the Convention for all its acts, also if the act in question is a mere necessity to comply with international legal obligations. 144 In reconciling these principles, the Court first held that implementing acts of Member States fall squarely within their jurisdiction and therefore within the reach of the Convention. 145 It next formulated the equivalent protection test, first introduced in M. & Co. 146 , by stipulating that State action taken in compliance with legal obligations stemming from its membership of an international organisation which protects fundamental rights in a manner equivalent to that of the Convention, is presumed to be in conformity with the Convention. 147 Such presumption could be rebutted, if the circumstances of the case show that protection was manifestly deficient. 148 The equivalent protection test has aptly been described as not 'identical') protection as under ECHR, implementing activity of a member State is in principle -but for the rebuttal -immune from the Court's scrutiny.
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The Bosphorus test was applied in all later cases involving Member State implementation of European Union decisions, albeit, it has been submitted, not always consistently. 150 Bosphorus was also applied to other international organisations. 151 Bosphorus has been welcomed by some for allowing, on a case by case basis, a review of the level of human rights protection in the EU legal order. 152 It allows not only for a scrutiny of human rights protection in the organisation in abstracto (the equivalent protection-test), but also for a determination of whether in the circumstances of the case protection has been effective (the manifest deficient-test). 153 It has nonetheless been questioned whether indeed the notions of strengthening international cooperation and the need to secure the proper functioning of international organisations as relied on in Bosphorus, should be considered so fundamental as to allow for a conditional immunity of acts which are fully attributable to a Member State. As noted by several authors, Bosphorus may ultimately result in a double standard of human rights protection as regards unilateral State action and action taken in a capacity of member State. 154 It may thus be questioned why the Court should treat conduct resulting from obligations as member of an international organisation different from activity which sprouts from other sources of international law, which are normally subjected to the Court's full scrutiny. 155 The Court's approach creates a state of affairs where, even though human rights are accorded ever greater primacy in the global era, the very agents of this global era -international organisations -are not only themselves exempted from external human rights scrutiny, but allow member States to share in their immunity. 
Accession of the EU to the ECHR
The future accession of the EU to the ECHR provides, at least in the European legal order, a welcome opportunity to address this paradox. After accession, the acts, measures and omissions of the EU, like every other Contracting Party, will be subject to the external control exercised by the Court in the light of the rights guaranteed under the Convention. 157 It will also be possible to lodge a complaint against the EU and a member State simultaneously.
The fact of EU accession does not however in itself resolve the issues underlying As noted in section 2.2 above, in respect of the co-respondent mechanism, an amendment to the Convention is foreseen stipulating that the admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the participation of the co-respondent in the proceedings. 160 This applies not only to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the co-respondent, but also to victim status. The Draft Explanatory report explains that where an application is directed against both the EU and an EU member State, the mechanism would also be applied if the EU or its member State was not the party that acted or omitted to act in respect of the applicant, but was instead the party that provided the legal basis for that act or omission.
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A second issue concerns the autonomy of the Union as a legal entity. The autonomy of Union law and consequently the exclusive competence of the CJEU to ensure compliance with Union law and decide upon the division of competence between the 159 Ibid, Article 3(1)(2), amending Article 36 ECHR. The Agreement also introduces the possibility, in the event a complaint is direct against the EU and one or more of its member States, for the Court to change status of any respondent to that of a co-respondent, Article 3(4). 160 Art 3(1)(b). 161 Draft Explanatory report (n 157), para 3.7 competence of the Court to assess the conformity of EU law with the provisions of the Convention does not prejudice the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law, the Draft Agreement sets forth that, in situations where EU law is at issue but where no preliminary ruling of the CJEU was previously obtained, an internal EU procedure is to be put in place before the Court decides upon the merits of the case.
This procedure would allow the CJEU to review the compatibility of the provision of EU law at issue with the Convention. It is expressly stated that the assessment of the CJEU will not bind the Court. 163 The co-respondent mechanism also serves to prevent the Court from deciding on the distribution of competences between the EU and the Union. To this purpose, and quite notably, it is envisaged that the co-respondent mechanism would allow for the finding of a violation without specific apportionment of responsibility between the EU and a member State. This is not laid down in the Draft Agreement, but follows from the Explanatory report:
[T]he respondent and the co-respondent(s) may be jointly responsible for the alleged violation in respect of which a High Contracting Party has become a corespondent. Should the Court find this violation, it is expected that it would ordinarily do so jointly against the respondent and the co-respondent(s); there would otherwise be a risk that the Court would assess the distribution of competences between the EU and its member States. The respondent and the corespondent(s) may, however, in any given case make joint submissions to the Court that responsibility for any given alleged violation should be attributed only to one of them.
On this basis, one might expect the Court, instead of determining on the independent responsibility of the EU or the member State, to pronounce upon the joint responsibility of the EU and an implementing member State in Bosphorus-type situations, and perhaps also in respect of violations directly stemming from founding treaties agreed upon by the member States and implemented by an EU institution. 164 Although there are still several outstanding issues and the full import of the Draft agreement -when it is ratified -will depend on its interpretation by the Court, it is anyhow clear that the accession of the EU to the ECHR provides some unique prospects for further developing the law on shared responsibility. The introduction of the co-respondent mechanism may be taken as recognition that the traditional attribution rules are not well tailored to the special relationship between the EU and its member States. Possibly, the co-respondent mechanism will signal a novel concept of responsibility in international law apart from independent or derived responsibility.
Further, the relaxation of admissibility thresholds in the co-respondent procedure would constitute codification of the idea that an individual must also be able to seek redress from a party that is not the author of the breach but acts through an intermediary party.
Principles of shared liability in the case law of the Court
The legal consequence of an internationally wrongful act is that the responsible State is under an obligation to make reparation for the injury sustained. 165 The principles applicable to distributing reparation obligations among multiple wrongdoing States are however unclear. International law provides scarce authority on the issue. The ILC left the matter undecided in its Articles on State Responsibility. 166 The ICJ has only sporadically touched upon the topic, without setting forth generally applicable principles. 167 The one uncontested rule appears to be that it should never be possible for the injured State to obtain reparation greater than the injury sustained. 168 But as regards the distribution of reparation obligations, it is unsure whether liability should as a rule be proportionate to the share of each State in the harm -in accordance with, for example, the degree of culpa or the causal connection between the breach and damage -or that it is governed by the principle of joint and several liability.
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The ECtHR case law on allocating liability among multiple contributing actors is neither grounded in well-developed principles, which may in part be explained from the subsidiary nature of the duty to provide just satisfaction of Article 41 ECHR. In Rantsev, also concerning independent conduct in relation to a single injury, the Court took the second approach. It considered that the failure of the Cypriot authorities to protect the victim from trafficking, to investigate whether she had been trafficked and to conduct an effective investigation into her death (Articles 2 and 4) to have caused anguish and distress to her father, who was the author of the complaint, awarding him the sum of EUR 40,000 to be paid by Cyprus. In respect of Russia's procedural violation of Article 4, the Court awarded him EUR 2,000 in non-pecuniary damage. 173 This approach is also present in the cross border child custody case of 
Conclusion
Even though the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on issues of shared responsibility suffers from inconsistencies and its case-by-case approach renders it problematic to formulate generally applicable principles, the Court has made a significant contribution to the law on shared responsibility. Moreover, the Court's pronouncements and the wide variety of issues brought before it have provided ample occasion for scholarly reflection, thus furthering legal theory on shared responsibility.
Perhaps the key feature of the Court's approach to shared responsibility is its firm adherence to the principle of independent responsibility. The typical approach of the Court in cases involving multiple wrongdoers is to isolate the independent conduct of 
